Ponder Anew 2!

"Pain Seeking Understanding: Suffering, Medicine and Faith." Edited by Margaret E. Mohrmann. October, 1999. 216 pages.

"Christian Ethics: An Essential Guide" by Robin W. Lovin. Abingdon Press, 2000. 137 pages.

Does Christian Ethics Exist?

Richard Rice Discusses Open Theism

Daniel C. Dennett Won't Break Religion's Spell and Here's Why

Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism. by Cornel West. Penguin Books, 2004. 229 pages.

May 30, 2007. This the book my colleagues and I recently discussed at the new home of Professor and Mrs. Andy Lampkin here in Loma Linda.

I am impressed by how intensely "American" it is in its great hopefulness. Like so many of us who are also Americans, West apparently thinks that people can "fix" things, that it is actually within humanity's power to improve life for everybody all around the world. Not everyone is convinced of this.

West's argument is that the United States today is beset by economic, militaristic and religious fundamentalism against which it must rally the resources of its "deep democratic tradition," as seen in the legacies of Greek Socratic questioning, Hebrew prophetic practice and "dark hope."

He claims that we can detect this "tragiccomic hope" in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emmerson, Herman Melville, James Baldwin and Toni Morrison and that we can hear it in the blues, jazz and hip-hop.

West writes with the learning and passion we rightly expect from the foremost public theologian in America today. He uses democracy matters as both a noun and a verb. He is a Christian, but a fundamentalist.

As West sees them, the three overlapping fundamentalisms that now threaten those of us who are Americans compel us to face the sad plight of our nation that from its beginnings has proclaimed the ideals of liberty and justice for all while imperialistically denying these rights to millions of people within and beyond our borders.

He pinpoints the issue of race as the clue by which to understand our entire culture.

I admit without pleasure that as a white middle class male American his emphasis upon race sometimes makes me feel uncomfortable. This is what he rightly intends!

West's critiques are actually even-handed. His assessment of the Israeli/Palestinian struggle calls on both sides to act in their common interests without either one losing its identity and security. He criticizes philosophers John Rawls and Richard Rorty as well as theologians Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank for stifling in different ways the public expression of religious moral convictions while acknowledging the positive contributions each is otherwise making. His assessments of blues, jazz and hip-hop are more judicious than many.

The examples of this book's decency and fairness are numerous.

West comes across to me as an American who calls upon all of us who are also Americans to live more and more in harmony with our ideals rather than our imperialistic impulses and practices. He does not write as an "outsider," a "former" or "anti" American ethically speaking, but as one who who lives and moves and finds his being in our culture and in its never-ending moral struggles.

We wondered in our discussion if his celebration of our "precious democratic experiment" is grounded in an optimistic or pessimistic view of human nature. Probably both. In any case his confidence that we Americans can do better cries aloud from every page.

Some might think that his hopeful conviction that we can make democracy work at home and gently (no shock and awe!) take root and flourish in different cultural soils abroad is altogether too American. I don't.

Kyle Fedler on "Bioethics and 'Biblical Personhood'"

Kyle Fedler, Chair of the Religion Department at Ashland University in Ohio, was the speaker on January 17 for the second of nine presentations on "The Moral Status of the Human Fetus" in the Jack W. Provonsha Lectures Series at Loma Linda University.  This series is organized by LLU's Center for Christian Bioethics.  Mark Carr is the Director and Dawn Gordon is the Manager.

Fedler's title was "Child or Chattel:  Biblical Views on the Moral Status of the Embryo."  It was clear from the outset that for him the Old and New Testaments constitute a religious canon and not merely a cultural classic.  They do for me as well. 

The conclusion of his presentation was that combining Biblical perspectives with contemporary scientific knowledge yields the conclusion that the new life should be viewed as a human person from about four to five weeks of gestational age and onward. 

This presumably allows for contraceptive measures that frustrate implantation, like IUDs and RU486, so-called "morning after pills," stem cell research and discarding unclaimed embryos at fertility clinics.

Fedler reminded the audience that the Old and New Testaments were written in a variety of genres over a number of centuries a long time ago and that neither makes any direct reference to abortion, pro or con.  Arguments from silence either way need to be viewed with caution, he stated.

He reviewed a number of passages that people use in support of the full personhood of the fetus.  Some of these speak against shedding human blood(Genesis 9:6) and for having many children IGenesis 13:16 & 15:5).  Other passages depict God interacting with prenatal human life:  Isaiah (Isaiah 49:1) Jeremiah (Jeremiah 1:4), a psalmist (Psalm 139:13-16) and Job (Job 10:8-11).

Fedler also referred to two passages that seem to accord less than full personhood to the fetus.  In one of these (Numbers 5:11-28), he said, the priests are instructed to give women who are suspected of being unfaithful to their husbands a potion that will cause them to abort if they are guilty.  This suggests that the lives of fetuses was less important than determining what the women had actually done.

The second passage (Genesis 2:7) states that at creation God breathed "into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being. "   Fedler said that some infer from this passage that the new life should not be viewed as a person until he or she can independently breathe, shortly after birth.

Fedler also commented on the most controversial passage of them all: 

When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman's husband demands, paying as much as the the judges determine.  If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.  Exodus 21:22-24.  New Revised Standard Version.

He identified three interpretative translations.  In the New Revised Standard Version one finds the most frequent reading.  This is that the lighter penalty of a fine is appropriate if the woman miscarries but experiences no further harm.  If she, the woman, is harmed above and beyond the miscarriage, the more severe penalty is required.

In the New International Version the woman does not miscarry; she prematurely gives birth to a living infant.  If this is all that happens, the fine applies.  But if in addition to this either the mother or the prematurely born infant is harmed, then the greater punishment is required.

Both the NRSV and the NIV are contemporary translations, the first more "ecumenical" and the second more "evangelical" as people in the United States often use these terms. 

Felder checked the Septuagint as well.  In this ancient Greek translation of the Old Testament Hebrew, the distinction is between an unformed and formed fetus when the woman miscarries.  If it is "unformed," presumably because it is very young in gestational age, the fine is the penalty.  If the fetus is formed, presumably because it is further along in the pregnancy, it is the more drastic "life for life, eye for eye" and so forth.

Fedler noted that some see in the New Testament condemnations of pharmakeia (Galatians 5:19-21 and Revelation 9:21) a warning against using drugs that cause abortions.  He also notes that the text uses  brephos, a Greek word for "child," when it declares that John jumped in his mother Elizabeth's womb when she heard the greeting of Mary, who was pregnant with Jesus.

Finding none of these passages definitively illuminating, whether in the Old or New Testament, Felder followed Richard Hayes in The Moral Vision of the New Testament (HarperSanFrancisco, 1996) in seeking guidance from seemingly unrelated passages that may actually be more helpful.  One of these is the story Jesus told about "The Good Samaritan" (Luke 10:25-37) in which the boundaries between those who are worthy of our protection and assistance are broadened to include more those often left out. 

Another is the suggestion that Christians ought to follow the example of Jesus Christ, "Who though he was in the form of God, did hot regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself,taking the form of a slave" and so forth (Philippians 1:5-7).  Instead of giving us specific instructions, Fedler suggested that passages such as these depict in broad strokes what kinds of people those of us who are Christians should be and what kinds of things we should do."

Fedler's own proposal was that "somewhere between two weeks and four weeks the embryo undergoes developments that result in it becoming what the Bible would characterize as a person."  This rests upon what he understands "Biblical personhood," to be, on the one hand, and scientific evidence, on the other.

"Possessing human DNA is neither sufficient nor necessary for being a 'person,' he held.  It is not sufficient because things like skin cells have human DNA and no one thinks of them as "persons."  It is not necessary because there may well be "persons" who do not have human DNA.  If I recall correctly, Fedler described ET as a "person" of this sort.

To be a "person" in the Biblical sense of the term, Fedler contended, is to be an individual who either has the ability to be in relationships--presumably, I'm guessing, with self, others and God--or this potential.  He held that the new life begins to possess this potential between four and five weeks of gestational age because this is when its central nervous system begins to form.  Before then its structure is too simple.

Both at the beginning and at the end of his presentation, Fedler emphasized that there is no "definitive moment" before which nothing matters and afterward everything does.  Rather, from fertilization to birth the entire process of human gestation is a relatively smooth process.  But after a month or so the new life has developed enough neurological complexity to require us to treat it differently, he contended.

.................................

If there had been an opportunity, I would like to have explored several issues with Fedler. 

The first of these would have concerned Exodus 21.  Although I respect and appreciate the care with which he examined its various interpretations, I find it unnecessary to do so because the verses in question are embedded in a passage that contains much material that we rightly do not apply to our lives today.  The very verses in question portray the woman as the property of her husband who deserves to be compensated if she is harmed. 

Instead of doing what Fedler did, I think it is appropriate to exhibit this and then to move on to other things, having established that no one can legitimately appeal to this portion of Scripture in making his or her case about the moral status of the human embryo.

My second question would have concerned the likely implications of his emphasis on "personhood" at the other end of life.  I believe that his position implies that humans who have permanently lost the ability to enter into relationships are no longer "persons" in the technical way he is uses the term.  The implication of this would seem to be that in such cases we need not--or perhaps even should not--prolong the individual's life but instead do everything we can to make his or her process of dying as comfortable and dignified as possible.

I agree with Fedler's emphasis upon "personhood" and I endorse these likely implications.  I suspect that he endorses them too; however, I would like to know for certain.  I also hope that we can replace "person" and "non-person" with terms that are less likely to be misunderstood.  But I'm not sure what they might be!

My third question would have concerned the importance he put on the fourth or fifth week.  I am not sure what he would find ethically acceptable before this and what he would find ethically unacceptable after it.  He did say that his position does not mean that before the first month "anything goes."  We can therefore presume that he would also that it does not mean that after this time "nothing goes."  But to my recollection Fedler was not more specific than this.

But why choose the first month?  It seems to me that implantation is the most dramatic change in an otherwise relatively smooth process and that from then on we need to keep in mind that we are dealing with two biologically human and living entities.  Once it has successfully implanted, the new life has the potential, meaning the inherent power, to become a human person and that as gestation progresses it increases moves toward this goal. 

Already at implantation, within the first week or so, in my view, it is a potential human person.  Before that, the conceptus, and before that the ovum and sperm, are not potential but possible human persons.  What happens around the fourth or fifth week is important; however, as Felder himself said, the entire process is relatively smooth.  I would say that this is so after implantation but not before.

For me this means that those of us who are Christians should be much more hesitant about terminating an established pregnancy than discarding or using in research or therapy embryos that have not implanted.  Although this provides much opportunity for manipulating stem cells, it amounts to a strong ethical presumption against abortion and this presumption intensifies as the pregnancy progresses.

All presumptions can be overturned and a number of additional factors can overturn this one.  These include rape, incest, serious fetal malformations and significant threats to the woman's physical, mental and social wellbeing. 

Just as in a court of law an individual is presumed to be Innocent until the evidence establishes otherwise, so also I think that those of us who are Christians should presume that an embryo that has successfully implanted should be protected until other factors indicate the contrary.  The default position is "pro-life" but this is presumptive, not absolute.

My responses to Fedler are endeavors in Christian bioethics that say nothing about what laws or other public policies should regulate the practice of abortion for all citizens.  All laws should embody ethical principles but not all ethical principles should be embodied in laws. 

My view is that at present and well into the foreseeable future some national norm along the lines of Roe v Wade is the most appropriate public policy, all things considered.   

 

               

Hitchens, Christopher. "The Portable Atheist: Essential Readings for the Nonbeliever." Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2007. xxvi - 499 pages.

At the Melbourne airport on the way home from Adelaide where I attended a conference at the University of South Australia, and spent some time with my wife's family, I purchased this anthology and I'm glad I did.  I'm still reading it and will probably continue doing so for some time, selecting this or that as I see fit.

It is a remarkably comprehensive and convenient collection of material by thoughtful nonbelievers.  It includes things from legendary figures such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Marx, Darwin and Freud.  It also offers reflections by some of the most eloquent and energetic doubters of our time:  Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris, Michael Shermer, and Hitchens himself. 

I strongly recommend it as a useful resource for all who are interested in religious belief, whether pro or con.  Although it offers few new arguments, it is a handy compendium of the existing ones.

Hitchens' emotional intensity exudes from his "Introduction" to the book as a whole as a well as from his shorter ones to particular authors.  On his first page, with many similar outbursts to come, he refers to religious beliefs and practices with expressions such as "useless prayers," "bogus 'miracles," "idiotic ceremonies of hysterical thanksgiving, "primitive stupidities and "old superstitions."  He depicts the writers with whom he agrees as "great" (Dennett) authors of "elegant contributions" (Shermer) who write with "courage and humor and intelligence in the face of dumb and sinister religiosity" (Dawkins).

We usually tiptoe around such excess in order not to disturb talented but troubled people.  We should take Hitchens more seriously than that, however.  Although he is more shrill than most, his voice is representative of a growing number of citizens who are alarmed.  Most of these are unbelievers, but quite a few are believers. I am a member of the second group. 

We believers know that we can flourish with unbelievers who laugh at us but do us no greater harm.  We cannot survive with other people of faith who would compel all of us to believe and do what they require.

This is why I share the concerns of Hitchens and his comrades even though I disagree with their atheistic conclusions.  We live in an era of increasing religious strife despite, or perhaps because of, the powerful secularizing forces of the last several centuries.  These developments should bother all of us. 

Hitchens and his colleagues would probably be nonbelievers in more favorable times; however, I doubt that their atheism would be as devout and fervent.  Eschewing the still small voice, they scream "Beware!" "Look out!" "Danger ahead!"  We should all take heed.

There is something these atheists know but perhaps do not take seriously enough.  This is that we human beings are "pattern-making mammals," to use Hitchens' apt expression. 

One of the ways we differ from other animals is that we conceive the most comprehensive accounts of all things that we can and then we pinpoint our little lives within them so as to give us some sense of who we are, what we should admire [worship!], how we should live, when we are out of line and whether we can do anything about it.

Providing comprehensive schemes in which we meaningfully locate ourselves is the primary business of religion.  Explaining unusual events, advocating this or that deity or gluing societies together isn't.  Neither is some combination of these.  Serving the needs of "pattern-making mammals" by mythos creation is what religion is all about.  Some religions do it better than others, all things considered.

It will not do to tell people again and again that their lives have no purpose other than what they can give them, that there are no standards of right and wrong other than what they prefer, and that there is no future other than what they can create. 

Even this is an implicit religion or mythos, of course; however, it is one that has very little staying power.  One exception might be the earliest form of Buddhism that invites us to embrace total meaninglessness and inescapable suffering and gives us ways to cope.  But even it was not able to remain this austere among the masses for very long.

In saying this I am not trying to promote any particular mythos or religion even though I am a Christian of sorts.  Because I believe that they rest upon a false dichotomy, I am not even holding out for the usual forms of supernaturalism.  I am only trying to depict human life as I think it actually is.  The horrific failure of every society so far that insisted by the force of arms upon complete secularism supports my claims, I believe.

Let us say it again:  The antidote to bad religion is not no religion but good religion.

If faced with the necessity of choosing between absolutely no religion or mythos at all, on the one hand, or religious fanaticism, on the other, most people will choose the second and some of them will be very bright.  And yes, I do use the term "bright" advisedly.

Hitchens and company rightly criticize much religious belief and practice and it easy to find in them an abundance of credulity and cruelty.  So far, so good.  Yet this is not enough. 

They or others who share their convictions must also propose some explicit comprehensive scheme and place our lives within it .  They must offer their own religion or mythos so that we can compare it with others. 

We are doomed if we try to live without any at all.   

   

      

John B. Cobb, Jr. on Intercessory Prayer

I found some recent reflections by Claremont theologian John B. Cobb, Jr. on intercessory prayer very helpful.  Others may too!  They are at Process and Faith.

Richard Rice Discusses Open Theism

Richard Rice, a theologian at Loma Linda University who launched the most recent expression of "Open Theism" and gave it its name, explained its basic themes to several dozen universities students on Friday, evening, November 14.  For my summary and reactions, please visit the Spectrum Blog and SDA Gender Justice.

Christianity and Particularity

Here is something I posted on the current Spectrum Blog discussion of "I'm an Adventist because....."  The Spectrum Site is worth visiting too!

Several of us have commented on the differences between being a Christian and being a Seventh-day Adventist, usually indicating that the first is prior in some way to the second. In many ways this makes sense.

Yet I doubt that it is possible entirely to separate these chronologically or experientially. When anyone becomes a Christian he or she necessarily becomes one of some sort. No one gets to become a Christian as such.

When we become Christians we do so either as SDAs, Roman Catholics, Baptists, Methodists.......or some mix of these. We might deny this but this is usually because we are unaware of the pedigrees of the types of Christianities we embrace.

There are no birds as such, only particular kinds of birds. There are no horses as such, only particular kinds of horses. There are no flowers as such, only particular kinds of flowers. True, these all may have mixed pedigress; however, none of them is wholly without one.

We might call this the principle of particularity. Nothing exists unless it exists in some specific way.

This is why I am not ashamed that I am a Seventh-day Adventist Christian. At least I know part of my pedigree!

Humanity and God in Christian Ethics

Class Presentation
Loma Linda University
October 16, 2007

1. John Calvin: All our knowledge consists of two related things: our understanding of God and our understanding of our selves. One can understand neither without reference to the other. All work in Christian ethical thought includes both. This outline concerns the second.

2. Many ways of understanding ourselves are dualistic. The thought of Plato in antiquity and Rene Descartes at the dawn of modernity are examples. Plato pictured Socrates encouraging his friends not to mourn his soon death because his soul would not perish when his body did. Descartes distinguished between thinking substance (“mind”) and extended substance (“matter”) and held that human beings are comprised of both.

3. Despite its less than inclusive language, the Loma Linda University motto “To Make Man Whole” is ethically significant. It expresses the institution’s rejection of dualism. Hoping not to be confused with other positions, the university summarizes its view as “wholism” rather than either “holism” or even “monism.” Wholism is one of the beliefs of the Seventh-day Adventist Christians who founded and still operate the university.

4. SDAs are among many others who reject dualism for a variety of reasons. One of these is that its conceptual incoherence is seen in its inability to depict how two fundamentally different kinds of things (“mind/matter” or “soul/body”) interact. This has led to many forms of idealism that make matter or the body secondary and perhaps derivative and many forms of materialism that make mind or the soul secondary and perhaps derivative. Hegel’s thought is an example of the first, Marx’s of the second. Rejecting both of these alternatives, others have proposed ways they might interact more equally. None of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory.

5. Continuing developments in neurology and other sciences constantly erode dualistic convictions in favor of those that picture the mind or soul as “functions” rather than “substances.” The brain thinks just as the eye sees and the ear hears. We should therefore probably speak of “minding,” along the lines of “seeing” and “hearing,” rather than of “the mind.”

6. The implications of dualism for economic, sexual, medical and ecological ethics have not been entirely favorable. When sharp distinctions are drawn between mind or soul, on the one hand, and matter or body, on the other, the second almost always is depreciated in favor of the first. The negative consequences of this over the span of centuries are evident.

7. Ecumenical Biblical scholarship today widely contends that Hebrew thought was wholistic and Greek dualistic. In neither case is this difference absolute or complete because there are portions of Scripture that sound dualistic and perhaps some forms of ancient Greek thought that don’t. The contention is that in general the weight of evidence tips one way in Hebrew thought and the other way in Greek.

8. Holding that the human body is the temple of the Holy Spirit rather than the temporary prison of the soul, the SDAs who founded and operate LLU have held that physical health and healing is spiritually significant and vice versa. This is one reason why they have invested so much in preparing people for service in the various medical professions.

God and Humanity in Christian Ethics

"Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar....Understanding Philosophy Through Jokes."

Coercive or Persuasive Power: Which Is Stronger?